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ABSTRACT
When a mass casualty event occurs, why do some people label it terrorism while others
do not? People are more likely to consider an attack to be terrorism when the
perpetrator is Muslim, yet it is unclear what other factors influence perceptions of mass
violence. Using data collected from a national sample of U.S. adults shortly after the
2017 Las Vegas shooting, we examine how media consumption and social identity
influence views of the attack. Media consumption and individual-level factors—
Islamophobia, political ideology, and other participant demographics—influence how
people view the attack and how confident people are in their assessments.

On 1 October 2017, a gunman opened fire on the crowd of a country music festival in
Las Vegas. During the course of 11 minutes, Stephen Paddock fired over one thousand
rounds of ammunition into the crowd below, killing 58 people and injuring another
851.1 This attack was, no doubt, terrifying. But, do members of the public consider it to
be terrorism? In the days, weeks, and months following the shooting, debate ensued
about whether or not we should refer to the attack as terrorism and Paddock as a
terrorist.2 Beyond the Las Vegas shooting, the public, media, and politicians have
debated whether or not to consider some mass violence as terrorism in cases including
Dylann Roof’s 2015 attack in Charleston3 and James Alex Fields Jr.’s attack in
Charlottesville.4 In contrast, the label of terrorism was quickly applied to other cases,
including Omar Mateen’s 2016 attack in Orlando5 and Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov’s
2017 attack in New York City.6 We are interested in why some members of the public
would consider a recent attack to be terrorism while others would not. Importantly, our
focus in the present study is on the public’s response to an event. That is, we utilize the
lack of a stated motive to focus on the factors that members of the public consider in
determining whether or not to call an event terrorism.
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual
use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic,
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”7 While scholars
generally rely on this operational definition of terrorism, there is no definitive conceptual
definition of terrorism. Researchers tend to debate specific inclusion or exclusion
criteria—nonstate actors, for example—but agree on the basic necessary attributes, like
a political, economic, religious, or social goal, and the use or threat of violence. 8 Among

the public (of which media is a part), however, many have a general idea of
what terrorism is but public definitions lack nuance, specificity, and consistency.9 Thus,
the public does not have a clear definition of terrorism against which any act of violence
can be systematically evaluated. For this reason, we expect that other factors, like
media consumption and personal views, will influence how members of the public define
a recent violent attack.
Each of the aforementioned attacks is considered terrorism in the GTD. Some
individuals, however, disagree with these classifications. Particularly in the aftermath of
Paddock’s attack in Las Vegas, one public narrative emerged that if Paddock were
Muslim then people would be quick to label the attack as terrorism, even in the absence
of a clearly stated motive.10 Indeed, recent scholarship has shown that media
disproportionately cover terrorism when the perpetrator is Muslim.11 Further, this
coverage is more likely to describe the incident as terrorism.12 Similarly, even when all
other factors are the same, members of the public are more likely to label a hypothetical
attack as terrorism when the perpetrator is Muslim.13 One limitation of these studies is
that they do not address disparities among the public in how people categorize actual
violent incidents. Thus, we do not yet understand why some people label a real, recent
violent attack as terrorism while others do not.
From an academic perspective, a necessary condition for classifying violence as
terrorism is that the perpetrator had a political, religious, economic, or social motive. 14 In
the immediate aftermath of the Las Vegas shooting, no clear motive emerged for
Paddock’s actions. Over a year later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation
concluded that they could not identify a motive for the attack.15 Still, there is debate
among experts on whether or not we should consider the shooting to be terrorism. The
GTD includes the shooting among its attacks and cites evidence of a far-right-wing
motivation.16 Other experts, such as Mark Pitcavage17 and John Horgan,18 disagree with
this categorization and argue that the evidence of a far-right connection is too weak. In
short, while some attacks clearly are or are not terrorism, the Las Vegas shooting is not
such a case and thus there is not an absolutely correct answer to whether or not it
should be considered terrorism. Our aim here is not to delve into this debate. Rather,
we are interested in how members of the public view the attack. The ambiguity
surrounding how to categorize the Las Vegas shooting allows us to explore what factors
push members of the public to classify it as terrorism or not, particularly in the
immediate aftermath of the attack.
How the public perceives and categorizes violence can influence the range of both
policy and legal responses that are deemed acceptable or appropriate. For example,
when violence is perceived as terrorism, people are more supportive of harsh treatment
including torture.19 Higher perceived terrorism threats are also linked with greater
willingness to give up civil liberties.20 Further, in the United States there are a number of

additional legal penalties when a criminal act is classified as terrorism, and this may be
differentially applied based on perpetrator identity.21 In short, how a violent act is
classified influences public opinion, as well as social and legal responses.
This project therefore addresses the question: When the motive is ambiguous, why
do some people consider a recent violent incident to be terrorism while others do not?
We argue that there are two main drivers that can explain why some U.S. adults
consider the Las Vegas shooting to be terrorism while others do not: media framing and
individual views—including political ideology, race, and Islamophobia. Our article is
organized as follows: first, we outline the literature on perceptions and misperceptions
of terrorism and how this informs our understanding of terrorism. Next, we detail our
methodology to examine why some people considered the Las Vegas shooting to be
terrorism while others did not in a survey conducted a few weeks after the attack.
Finally, we discuss our findings, their limitations and avenues for future research, and
the implications of our results.

Background
Media and perceptions of terrorism
Media provide people with much of the information that they receive about the world
around them.22 The nature and extent of media coverage amplify some topics while
ignoring others. In turn, these media frames influence to what people pay attention and
to what positions or perspectives people are exposed.23 Particularly when someone has
not personally experienced something, media is critical to framing how the person
perceives that issue, place, or thing.24 There is ample evidence that media coverage
influences public perceptions on issues ranging from mental health to national
security.25 In the context of crime and justice broadly, a growing body of evidence
shows that media depictions influence how the public view issues of security, safety,
and threats.26
Media depictions of an issue are particularly impactful when people do not have
personal experience with it.27 In the context of terrorism, this is almost certainly the case
since the vast majority of people in the United States (thankfully) lack direct, personal
experience with this type of violence. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, people
receive most of their information—and thus frames—about the incident from
media.28 Terrorist attacks serve as focusing events—rare, attention-grabbing situations
that are easily politicized.29 Focusing events like terrorist attacks garner a large amount
of media attention and spark debates about the issue and how to address it. 30 Focusing
events also allow for information—true and false—to spread rapidly, particularly as
members of the public are able both receive media frames and to share those
perspectives among themselves31—which may exacerbate politically driven narratives

on terrorism and hate.32 While media frames may not dictate public perceptions and
debate on a topic, they do influence what issues the public discuss and how that debate
takes shape.33 Further, views on terrorism may be robust to new framing
effects.34 People who rate news to be more important to them should be more
influenced by media frames and focusing events.35 Specifically, we expect that:
H1: People who view news media as more important will be more likely to
consider a real, violent attack to be terrorism.
Media organizations are, of course, not homogenous. Politics influence media
representations of the world.36 Media provide disproportionate coverage to attacks when
the perpetrator is Muslim—and this over-coverage is drastically more prevalent in
national sources as compared to local ones.37 Further, this coverage is more likely to
describe the incident as terrorism as opposed to crime or due to mental
illness.38 Looking at crime coverage more broadly, cable news outlets are more likely to
exaggerate racial disparities in criminal activity than network news outlets.39 Across the
political spectrum, cable news reporting rarely includes actual academic experts to
discuss violence40 and regularly engages in outrage tactics, including
overgeneralizations and misrepresentations.41 Further, cable news broadcasts around
the clock, which provides substantially more content than either local television news or
print media. Thus, people who receive their information from different media sources
may view the world in incongruent ways. In short, we expect that media consumption
will influence whether or not a person considers a recent, violent attack to be terrorism.
From this discussion, we derive the following hypothesis:
H2: People who consume more cable news will be more likely to consider a real
violent attack to be terrorism.
Social identity and perceptions of terrorism
Social identity theory posits that people tend to have more positive views of people who
are more similar to themselves—their in-group—and hold more negative views of
people who they perceive as dissimilar from themselves—their out-group.42 A wide body
of literature supports that people show an affinity for members of their in-group over
members of an out-group.43 Across the literature, in-groups and out-groups are
conceptualized in a number of ways, including on the basis of ethnicity, political
ideology, and religion.44 Sometimes multiple identities—say, race and political
ideology—overlap but they are conceptually distinct and should uniquely influence
views of the respective out-groups.45 Regardless of the nature of the group-based
identity, in the context of terrorism and counterterrorism, people consistently view outgroup members as more likely to perpetrate violence46 and more deserving of harsher
punishments for their crimes.47 When a White person perpetrates mass violence in the
United States, the discussion often focuses on mental illness as opposed to

terrorism.48 Thus, among the White population in the United States, it may be difficult to
rectify that a member of their in-group—a fellow White person—is capable of engaging
in terrorism. From this, we expect that:
H3: White people will be less likely than non-White people to consider a really
violent attack to be terrorism when the perpetrator is White.
Further, social identity on the basis of political ideology may also influence whether
or not someone considers an attack to be terrorism based on the perpetrator’s identity.
Over the last few years, there has been an emerging discussion about media reticence
to use the words terrorism and terrorist to describe attacks when the perpetrator is
White.49 Despite attacks like Dylann Roof’s 2015 attack in Charleston and James Alex
Fields Jr.’s 2017 attack in Charlottesville that clearly meet the academic definition of
terrorism, public consensus has not been to describe these incidents as such. There are
notable differences in how terrorism is framed across the political spectrum. 50 On one
hand, the conservative narrative tends to focus on so-called radical Islamist terrorism as
the only—or at least the primary—terrorism threat in the United States.51 Thus,
conservative-leaning people may only consider a violent attack to be terrorism when the
perpetrator is Muslim. On the other hand, the liberal narrative sometimes argues that
mass violence by White people should be called terrorism because the same attack
would be considered such if the perpetrator were Muslim—and this argument is made
irrespective of the perpetrator’s motive.52 Thus, more liberal-leaning people may be
inclined to label all mass violence as terrorism, even when the motive is unknown.
Supporting this notion, experimental research shows that more conservative people are
more likely to view both hypothetical and real attacks as terrorism when the perpetrator
is Muslim.53 In contrast, more conservative people should be less likely to consider an
attack to be terrorism if the perpetrator is not Muslim. Relatedly, the discussion on
calling all mass violence terrorism—regardless of motive—is more prominent on the
political left.54 From this, we expect that:
H4: People who are more conservative will be less likely to consider a real
violent attack to be terrorism when the perpetrator is not Muslim.
Across news and entertainment media in the United States, Muslim or Arab actors
are more likely to play the terrorist or villain, which feeds into this stereotyped notion of
terrorism.55 Media frames terrorism as a threat stemming primarily from Muslims.
Among some in the population, this frame activates identity cues,56 which helps explain
why some people make an implicit association between terrorism and Islam57 and
consider Muslims to be a national security threat.58 In contrast, data show that Muslims
perpetrate a small portion of recent terrorist attacks in the United States.59 Still, some
hold anti-Muslim views. People who are more Islamophobic should have a strong
association between terrorism and Muslims. From this, we expect:

H5: People who are more Islamophobic will be less likely to consider a real
violent attack to be terrorism when the perpetrator is not Muslim.

Method
Data
Data for this project come from an online sample of U.S. adults that was administered
by Survey Sampling International. A total of 1,082 U.S. adults participated in the study
between 23 and 25 October 2017—roughly 3 to 3.5 weeks after the 2017 Las Vegas
shooting.
Design
For this project, we are interested in factors that influence whether or not a person
considered the 2017 Las Vegas shooting to be terrorism. At the time data were
collected, there was a broader debate in media and among the public about how to
classify this event.60 At the point of data collection, the public knew the perpetrator’s
name and background demographics, but no motive had been identified and
verified.61 During this time, public debate ensued over whether or not to consider this
shooting as terrorism. This provided us with a unique opportunity to examine what
factors influence whether or not a very recent, violent event should be considered
terrorism. The survey was laid out as follows: participants were first asked to answer
basic demographic questions. Participants answered a series of questions about news
consumption, trust in media, perceived Islamophobia, and trust in
science.62 Participants then answered questions about the Las Vegas shooting. Finally,
participants answered additional, potentially sensitive demographic questions. 63
Variables
Dependent variables
We are interested in factors that influence whether or not a person considered the 2017
Las Vegas shooting to be terrorism. Our main outcome of interest is whether or not
participants indicated that the Las Vegas shooting should be labeled as terrorism. Of
the 1,081 participants who answered this question, nearly two thirds (64.8 percent)
consider the shooting to be terrorism while 35.3 percent do not.
Beyond how participants categorize the shooting, we are also interested in how
confident they are in their categorizations, although this is exploratory. We next asked
how confident participants were in their assessment of whether or not the shooting
should be considered terrorism. Confidence in assessment was measured on a 4-point
scale from Not confident at all to Very confident. Table 1 presents a summary of
descriptive statistics for key variables.

Table 1. Demographics and descriptive variables. (Table view)
Dependent variables
Frequency Mean SD
Median Range
1: Las Vegas shooting is terrorism: Yes 64.75%
—
—
—
—
No
35.25%
—
—
—
—
2. How confident it is terrorism?
—
1.55 0.67
1
1-4
3. How confident it is not terrorism?
—
1.93 0.77
2
1-4
Independent variables
Frequency Mean SD Variance
α
Importance of News
—
3.22 0.78
0.62
—
News consumption: ABC
34.6%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: CBS
19.9%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: NBC
18.2%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: Huffington Post
14.2%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: New York Times
14.1%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: Washington Post
11.7%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: CNN
28.1%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: Fox News
26.1%
—
—
—
—
News consumption: MSNBC
11.9%
—
—
—
—
Political ideology: Very liberal
10.9%
—
—
—
—
Political ideology: Liberal
19.6%
—
—
—
—
Political ideology: Moderate
44.4%
—
—
—
—
Political ideology: Conservative
17.7%
—
—
—
—
Political ideology: Very conservative
7.4%
—
—
—
—
White
65.8%
—
—
—
—
Islamophobia
—
2.98 0.81
0.65
0.87
Male
34.1%
—
—
—
—
Age
—
41.33 13.48
40
—
Independent variables
The key predictors in our study are measured, participant-level variables: how important
news media is to the person, where the person gets their news, the person’s race,
political views, and level of Islamophobia.64 To measure importance of news, we asked
participants the following: “Many people do not find news to be important in their daily
life. How important is following the news to you?” Responses were measured on a 4point scale where higher scores indicate greater importance
(N = 1,082; M = 3.22; SD = 0.78).
To measure where the person gets their news, we followed norms in the
communications literature and provided participants with a list of nine popular news

sources that span both the ideological spectrum and type of media (ABC, CBS, CNN,
Fox News, Huffington Post, MSNBC, New York Times, NBC, Washington
Post).65 Participants were asked to indicate which source(s) they got their news from in
the last 48 hours (N = 1,082; M = 1.79; SD = 1.75). From this, we then conducted a
principal components analysis with orthogonal rotation (varimax) in order to assess any
underlying factors. The results, seen in Table 2, suggested a three-factor model
accounting for about 54 percent of the variation in how participants got their news. The
first factor was named Network News because it was composed of loading on questions
regarding consumption from the three major news networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC).
This factor accounted for 18.21 percent of the variance in respondents. The second
factor, which explained 13.51 percent of the variance, was labeled Cable News as it
was composed of questions about getting one’s news from CNN, Fox News, or
MSNBC. Finally, the third factor, which accounted for 22.20 percent of the variance,
was made up of questions about reading Huffington Post, the New York
Times, Washington Post, and as such was labeled Print Media. Overall these factors
are sufficiently related and showed a good fit with the data. All but two of the
communalities among these items indicated that the variables shared 50 percent or
more of their variance with the rest of the questions. Additionally, the Kaiser-MeyerOlkin was 0.71 and the Barlett’s test of Sphericity was 1161.37; both indicated that the
data were appropriately related for the use of Principal Component Analysis. 66
We measure social identity in two ways. First, we create a binary variable to indicate
whether or not the participant is White. A little under two thirds of the sample (65.8
percent) identify as White. Second, we measure participants’ political ideology on a 5point scale from very liberal to very conservative (N = 1,082; M = 2.91; SD = 1.05). The
plurality of participants (44.4 percent) identified as moderate, followed by liberal (19.6
percent), conservative (17.7 percent), very liberal (10.9 percent), and very conservative
(7.4 percent).
We measured Islamophobia using Kunst, Sam, and Ulleberg’s 12-item scale.67 Each
item was measured on a 6-point scale where higher scores suggest greater
Islamophobia. We then averaged scores to create a composite score
for Islamophobia for each participant. Scores ranged from 1 to 5.08
(N = 1,063; M = 2.98; SD = 0.81, α = 0.87).
We also include two control variables—gender and age—that may influence
perceptions of violence. The sample is 34.1 percent male. Because women are
overrepresented in the present dataset, we weighted the data by gender to correct this
for analyses and improve generalizability of our results. Participants ranged in age from
18 to 65 (N = 1,082; M = 41.33; SD = 13.48).

Table 2. Principal components analysis for news source. (Table view)
News source
Factor 1: Network
news

Loadings
Factor 2: Cable
news

Factor 3: Print
media

Communality

ABC News
CBS News
NBC News
CNN News
MSNBC News
Fox News
NYT News
Washington
Post
Huffington Post

0.62
0.76
0.74
0.19
0.30
−0.03
0.00
0.04

0.05
0.07
0.05
0.55
0.39
0.86
0.15
−0.02

−0.04
0.09
0.06
0.37
0.36
−0.15
0.75
0.69

0.39
0.59
0.55
0.48
0.37
0.75
0.59
0.48

0.04

0.01

0.81

0.65

Eigenvalue
Percent of
variance
Total variance

1.64
18.21%

1.22
13.51%

1.99
22.20%
53.92%

Note: Bold indicates that news sources grouped together by factor loading.

Exploratory variables
As an exploratory measure, we asked participants what would need to be different
about the event for them to change their classification of the Las Vegas shooting as
terrorism or not. We gave each participant a list of non-mutually exclusive options that
were presented in a randomized order. All participants were given the following options:
Use of a different weapon or method of attack; Different political affiliation of the
perpetrator; Different religious affiliation of the perpetrator; Different motive for the
attack; Something else {text box to add answer}.68 People who thought the attack
should be labeled as terrorism were also given the following options for what would
make them say it was not terrorism: A smaller scale attack; Fewer victims in the attack.
In contrast, people who thought the attack should not be labeled as terrorism were also
given the following options for what would make them say it was not terrorism: A larger
scale attack; More victims in the attack.

Results
Is the Las Vegas shooting terrorism?

We are interested in what factors impact whether or not someone considered the Las
Vegas attack to be terrorism a few weeks after the event. As shown in Table 3, our first
outcome measures this directly by asking participants whether or not the Las Vegas
attack is terrorism. Since the dependent variable is binary, we estimated a logistic
regression model (Model 1). To ease interpretability, we report odds ratios for each
independent variable where a ratio greater than one indicates a positive relationship
between the independent and dependent variable and a ratio less than one indicates a
negative relationship. Supporting H2, we see that a one-unit increase in consuming
cable television news is associated with a 25 percent increase in the odds of calling the
Las Vegas attack terrorism. As expected in H4, conservative participants are
significantly less likely to think the attack is terrorism—specifically, a one-unit increase
toward conservative views is associated with a 22 percent decrease in odds of calling
the attack terrorism. Supporting H5, people who are more Islamophobic are less likely
to consider the Las Vegas shooting terrorism—specifically, a one-unit increase in
Islamophobia is associated with an 18 percent decrease in odds of calling the attack
terrorism. Contrary to what we had hypothesized, the importance of news media (H1)
and participant’s race (H4) did not influence how people label the Las Vegas shooting.
Results also show that a one-year increase in age is associated with a 2 percent
decrease in odds of calling the attack terrorism. Overall, we find mixed results for our
expectations about why some people call the Las Vegas shooting “terrorism” while
others do not.
Given the public debate on how to label the Las Vegas attack, we are also interested
in how confident people are in their assessments. An independent samples t-test shows
that people who said that the shooting should be considered terrorism are significantly
less confident in their assessment (M = 1.55) than those who said it should not be
(M = 1.83), t(1076) = 8.42, p < .001.
We next conduct exploratory analyses to examine whether the independent
variables influence confidence in assessments for the full sample (Model 2) and break
this out by those who said it was terrorism (Model 3) and that it was not terrorism
(Model 4). As Model 2 shows, overall people who think news is more important and men
are less confident in their label of the attack, whereas older people are more confident.
Among the subsample who said that the attack is terrorism (Model 3), people who think
news is more important are less confident in their assessment, whereas people who are
more Islamophobic are more confident. Finally, among the subsample who said that the
attack was not terrorism (Model 4), men are less confident in their assessments but no
other factors have an influence.

Table 3. Should the attack in Las Vegas be labeled as “terrorism”? (Table view)

Importance of
news
News
consumption:
Paper
News
consumption:
Network TV news
News
consumption:
Cable TV news
Political ideology
White
Islamophobia
Male
Age
Observations

Model 1:
Yes, it is
terrorism

Model 2:
Overall
confidence

Model 3:
It is terrorism:
Confidence

1.05 (0.10)

0.75** (0.07)

0.73* (0.09)

Model 4:
It is not
terrorism:
Confidence
0.81 (0.13)

1.05 (0.11)

0.88 (0.08)

0.86 (0.10)

0.97 (0.15)

0.95 (0.08)

1.03 (0.08)

1.12 (0.11)

0.92 (0.11)

1.25* (0.12)

0.85† (0.07)

0.87 (0.09)

0.82 (0.12)

0.78*** (0.05)
0.90 (0.14)
0.82* (0.07)
0.98 (0.14)
0.98** (0.01)
1,058

1.08 (0.07)
1.03 (0.14)
1.15 (0.10)
0.72* (0.09)
1.01* (0.01)
1,055

1.02 (0.09)
1.07 (0.18)
1.25* (0.12)
0.88 (0.14)
1.01† (0.01)
687

1.12 (0.13)
0.92 (0.22)
0.94 (0.16)
0.51** (0.12)
1.00 (0.01)
368

Note: Bold indicates statistical significance.
Model 1. DV: “Should the attack in Las Vegas be labeled as ‘terrorism’?” Response options: yes (1) and
no (0). Logistic regression model. Odds ratios presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Model 2, 3, and 4. Questions depending on response to how the attack should be labeled: “How confident
are you that the attack in Las Vegas should be labeled as ‘terrorism’?” or “How confident are you that the
attack in Las Vegas should not be labeled as ‘terrorism’?” Response options: not confident at all (1); not
too confident (2); somewhat confident (3); and very confident (4).
Ordered logistic regression models. Odds ratios presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constants not reported.
†
p < .10.
*
p < .05.
**
p < .01.
***
p < .001.

What would change your mind?
Research shows that public views on what is or is not terrorism are context
dependent.69 We asked participants what would change their mind and provided a list of
non-mutually exclusive choices: different weapon, different political ideology, different
religion, different motive, different scale, and different lethality. Table 4 shows the
percentage of participants who indicated that each of the aforementioned factors would

lead them to change their mind about how they categorize the attack. First, we used
independent samples t-tests with unequal variance to compare the frequency of
indicating each choice between those who said that the Las Vegas shooting is terrorism
and those who did not. People who said that the Las Vegas shooting is terrorism are
more likely to indicate that a different weapon (t(1076.77) = −6.00, p < .001), scale of the
attack (t(1079) = −9.57, p < .001), or number of victims (t(1076.22) = −9.38, p < .001)
would change their mind and were less likely to say that a perpetrator with a different
political ideology (t(622.66) = 3.29, p < .001), religious view (t(527.53) = 7.70, p < .001),
or motivation (t(715.37) = 9.49, p < .001) would change their mind.
Table 4. What would change your mind (Table view)

Use of a different weapon or
method of attack
Different political affiliation of the
perpetrator
Different religious affiliation of
the perpetrator
Different motive for the attack
A smaller-scale attack
A larger-scale attack
Fewer victims in the attack
More victims in the attack
Something else
Nothing

Yes, it should be labeled No, it shouldn’t be labeled
terrorism
terrorism
11.84%
2.88%
7.85%

14.66%

7.28%

26.18%

27.67%
25.68%
—
23.25%
—
22.84%
5.71%

56.54%
—
6.02%
—
4.97%
5.09%
0.26%

Next, we examine this further by estimating a series of logistic regression models to
explore whether any of our independent variables influence what would make someone
change their mind about how they label the Las Vegas shooting. As shown in Tables
5 and 6, few of our independent variables are related to reasons that someone said they
would change their mind about how to label the Las Vegas attack. Across these models,
there is not a consistent result or story. In short, people who think that the attack was
terrorism would change their minds for different reasons than those who think that it was
not terrorism, but other factors examined here do not clearly explain what reasons
people say would change their minds about how to label a recent violent attack.

Table 5. What would change your mind to say it is not terrorism? (Table view)
Model 5:
Different
weapon
Importance of
news

0.92
(0.17)

Model 6:
Different
political
affiliation
0.95
(0.19)

News
consumption:
Paper

1.02
(0.14)

0.73
(0.18)

0.91
(0.23)

1.02
(0.13)

1.08
(0.14)

0.83
(0.11)

News
consumption:
Network TV
news

1.38*
(0.18)

1.30
(0.25)

1.35
(0.25)

0.90
(0.10)

1.06
(0.12)

1.05
(0.11)

News
consumption:
Cable TV news

0.99
(0.15)

1.19
(0.22)

1.33
(0.24)

0.97
(0.12)

0.92
(0.12)

0.90
(0.11)

Political ideology

0.76*
(0.10)

0.84
(0.11)

1.00
(0.14)

1.03
(0.10)

1.18†
(0.11)

0.93
(0.09)

White

0.62†
(0.16)

1.05
(0.33)

1.95†
(0.73)

0.91
(0.17)

0.87
(0.17)

0.99
(0.20)

Islamophobia

1.07
(0.14)

0.72†
(0.12)

0.83
(0.17)

1.14
(0.12)

1.10
(0.13)

1.09
(0.14)

Male

0.82
(0.21)

1.11
(0.35)

1.07
(0.34)

1.45*
(0.27)

0.76
(0.15)

0.82
(0.16)

Age

1.00
(0.01)

0.99
(0.01)

0.99
(0.01)

0.99
(0.01)

0.99
(0.01)

0.99
(0.01)

688

688

688

688

688

688

Observations

Model 7:
Different
religious
affiliation
0.60*
(0.13)

Model 8:
Different
motive
1.02
(0.13)

Model 9:
Smallerscale
attack
0.91
(0.12)

Model
10:
Fewer
victims
1.22
(0.16)

Note: Bold indicates statistical significance.
Question: “What would need to be different about the event for it NOT to be labeled as a terrorist attack?”
Six Non-Mutually Exclusive Response Options Turned into Binary Dependent Variables: Use of a
different weapon or method of attack; Different political affiliation of the perpetrator; Different religious
affiliation of the perpetrator; Different motive for the attack; A smaller-scale attack; Fewer victims in the
attack.
Logistic regression models. Odds ratios presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constants not reported.
†
p < .10.
*
p < .05.
p < .01.
p < .001.

Table 6. What would change your mind to say it is terrorism? (Table view)
Model
11:
Different
weapon

Model 12:
Different
political
affiliation

Model 13:
Different
religious
affiliation

Model
14:
Different
motive

Model
16:
More
victims

0.91
(0.14)

Model
15:
Largerscale
attack
0.98
(0.34)

Importance of
news

1.87
(0.73)

1.01
(0.21)

1.41†
(0.21)

News
consumption:
Paper

1.49
(0.93)

0.45*
(0.15)

1.00
(0.20)

1.07
(0.19)

1.41
(0.39)

0.94
(0.43)

News
consumption:
Network TV
news

1.61†
(0.45)

1.16
(0.18)

1.01
(0.13)

1.00
(0.12)

1.05
(0.20)

0.80
(0.21)

News
consumption:
Cable TV news

0.37
(0.29)

1.39
(0.29)

1.06
(0.14)

1.11
(0.19)

1.16
(0.43)

0.82
(0.32)

Political ideology

1.02
(0.32)

0.85
(0.13)

1.06
(0.14)

0.87
(0.11)

1.10
(0.23)

1.14
(0.25)

White

0.10**
(0.08)

0.85
(0.33)

0.76
(0.23)

2.19**
(0.59)

2.22
(1.37)

0.30*
(0.16)

Islamophobia

1.05
(0.63)

1.16
(0.23)

0.86
(0.14)

0.98
(0.13)

1.17
(0.43)

1.11
(0.35)

Male

0.31†
(0.22)

0.63
(0.22)

0.99
(0.24)

1.00
(0.23)

1.32
(0.64)

1.53
(0.79)

Age

1.05
(0.03)

1.02
(0.02)

1.01
(0.01)

1.01
(0.01)

0.97
(0.02)

0.96
(0.02)

372

372

372

372

372

372

Observations

1.27
(0.30)

Question: “What would need to be different about the event for it to be labeled as a terrorist attack?”.
Six Non-Mutually Exclusive Response Options Turned into Binary Dependent Variables: Use of a
different weapon or method of attack; Different political affiliation of the perpetrator; Different religious
affiliation of the perpetrator; Different motive for the attack; A larger-scale attack; More victims in the
attack.
Logistic regression models. Odds ratios presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constants not reported.
†
p < .10.
*
p < .05.
**
p < .01.
p < .001.

Discussion
This research was aimed at addressing why some people consider a violent incident to
be terrorism while others do not. We expected that views would come from two places:
media framing of the incident and the person’s own beliefs that fill in the gaps. Our
results suggest that media consumption and Islamophobia are at the center of public
perceptions about what constitutes terrorism. This finding supports prior research that
shows a strong association between Muslims and terrorism in both media and public
perceptions.70 However, our results also suggest a fair amount of ambiguity in public
understanding. When asked what would change their minds about how to view a violent
incident, respondents provided a wide range of answers. As a result, while this study
cannot isolate a single causal story, it does add to our understanding of how media
consumption influences public views of a recent terrorist attack.
Given that most of the general public lack any direct experience or expertise in what
constitutes terrorism, it is perhaps not surprising that media consumption helped to
shape many people’s views of how to understand a violent incident. This is particularly
interesting given that research demonstrates that there is bias in the media’s coverage
of such events. This work suggests that media may serve to further both a general
sense of Islamophobia and the public’s ambiguity about what constitutes terrorism. For
example, research finds that—particularly among national sources—there is greater
coverage of a terrorist attack when the perpetrator is Muslim.71 Together with
experimental work suggesting that political ideology impacts people’s predispositions
about how to view violent incidents, media likely constitutes an important force in
shaping public opinion.72 This was evidenced in our finding that more cable news
consumption increased the likelihood that an individual would characterize a violent
attack as terrorism. Similarly, we also found that both Islamophobia and a conservative
political ideology significantly decreased the chances an individual would view the Las
Vegas shooting as terrorism. Yet, surprisingly, other aspects of media consumption—
such as the importance of news—did not have a meaningful effect on an individual’s
perceptions, which may help to clarify our understanding of the process by which media
shapes perspectives.
Given the uncertainty associated with the Las Vegas attack, we also asked
respondents how confident they felt in their classification of the event. In an effort to
better understand why it is that some people would or would not characterize an event
as terrorism, we then asked respondents what would change their mind. Interestingly,
those who indicated that news was more important to them were also generally less
confident in their characterization of the attack. This may be suggestive of a broader
sense of open-mindedness among these individuals. That is, people who place a higher
value on news and an awareness of current events may also be more willing to update

their views or to admit they could be wrong. Yet, while some respondents were less
confident than others, looking across the sample our results did not suggest what it
would take to broadly change people’s minds. Those who said the Las Vegas shooting
was terrorism were more likely to indicate that they would change their minds if the
attack involved a different weapon, a smaller scale of the attack, or fewer victims.
However, those who said the attack should not be labeled terrorism focused on other
factors. Among these, respondents were most likely to indicate that they would change
their minds if the attack involved: a different motive or a perpetrator with a different
political or religious affiliation. In spite of these differing sets of considerations, none of
the independent variables in this study could predict what would change someone’s
mind either to or against labeling the shooting as terrorism. Essentially, people appear
willing—at least in theory—to change their minds based on situational factors, but it is
unclear whether individual-level factors would also contribute to this decision.
In sum, our findings suggest that the lens of media—particularly cable news
coverage—and Islamophobia are at the heart of public perceptions about what
constitutes a terrorist attack. Yet it remains unclear what is required to change people’s
minds generally about such events. As a result, this research adds to our understanding
on the role of media consumption in shaping public understanding of terrorism, while
also suggesting the need for further research into how people process and understand
such events.

Conclusion
One limitation of this research is that it used a single survey collected a few weeks after
the shooting in Las Vegas took place. Future research could benefit from the use of a
panel design in which the same individuals could be followed over time. This could
prove particularly beneficial as media coverage of the event changes, new information
comes to light, and individuals’ unique understandings are able to develop. Such a
design could also help lend insight into the stability of public perceptions, particularly in
light of additional developments in the case and as new events take place. For example,
it may be that people are more willing to change their characterization when it is
reframed in the wake of some new event. In this same way, research using an
experimental design could prove useful to directly address what factors cause people to
change their minds about what constitutes a terrorist event. For example, being able to
experimentally control elements of an event rather than asking respondents to choose
what would change their mind could lend insight into how people process these types of
events. These types of experiments might also be able to look directly at what factors
impact an individual’s confidence in their assessment. Importantly, future studies can
also directly address the impact of education on how these types of events are viewed.

Much of the public lacks any formal education in what constitutes terrorism. As a result,
this likely shapes the lack of clear consensus on what would change their minds about
how to view events like the Las Vegas shooting. Relatedly, this study uses a single
event, the Las Vegas shooting. While this event provided an important opportunity to
examine an otherwise undefined incident, future research would likely benefit from
asking individuals to assess multiple incidents. This could prove particularly useful in
looking at the relative importance individuals place on different elements of the attack,
as well of the general stability of those opinions. For instance, comparing different
events could examine whether or not an attack of similar scale but with a Muslim
perpetrator changes the results found here. Our research suggests a number of future
projects are likely needed to better understand the complex process at work in shaping
public views of these types of attacks.
The results of this study contribute to a better understand of how media coverage
influences public perceptions of terrorism. The consumption of cable news in particular
appears central to shaping perceptions, even where the importance a person places on
news does not. Relatedly, level of Islamophobia is also central to whether or not a
person classifies violence as terrorism. Rarely does cable news have academic
researchers on to help inform public understanding.73 Yet the present study strongly
suggests the need for research and empirical evidence to be a central component of
media coverage. This is critical for several reasons. Academics provide an important
counterbalancing force against the Islamophobic tint of much media coverage.
Additionally, much of the public’s exposure to and understanding of terrorism comes to
them via the media. This is particularly important in a democracy where it is the public’s
understanding that is likely to influence policy. The label of terrorism may carry
increased penalties or other punitive responses.74 Given all of this, it is paramount that
conversation be informed by experts, facts, and data.
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